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Dissonant Constitutionalism and Lady Hale 
Brian Christopher Jones 
Stories of constitutional struggle almost always revolve around power and self-interest; the 
legislature looking to make its mark, or the executive overstepping certain bounds. It is the 
commonplace story of the separation of powers, each entity desiring more clout and none of 
them willing to concede any. These tired examples are external and overt, and align well with 
our thoughts on constitutional politics in contemporary democracies. Rarely do such accounts 
involve internal—personal—struggle. Additionally, constitutional struggles are almost always 
borne out in formal settings: the judiciary issuing a judgement, or a ministerial department 
issuing a new regulation. Rarely do such struggles involve more informal settings. The latter, 
in both these examples, is the struggle of Lady Hale, now President of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court. This piece argues that Lady Hale, much like many constitutional actors in the 
UK (lawyers, judges, scholars, etc.), is experiencing cognitive dissonance about the current 
state of the UK constitution, and especially its underlying principles. However evidence of her 
dissonance has not played out in formal settings, such as judgements, but in extra-judicial 
speeches, as will be shown below.   
The UK provides unique characteristics as to how and why such dissonance amongst 
constitutional actors may be more prevalent than elsewhere. In terms of its legal constitutional 
arrangements, the UK operates on what can be termed “Diceyan constitutionalism”: an 
uncodified constitution operating on parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, the former 
of which remains the underlying principle.1 Although this general approach still holds for the 
UK, a new method of legal protection, called the “new commonwealth model”, has arisen.2 
Even beyond the commonwealth, however, the constitutional landscape has further 
transformed. Written constitutions are the zeitgeist, and the powers of constitutional courts are 
 Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Dundee. Many thanks to Professor Colin Reid for comments on 
a draft version of this paper.  
1 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5, paras 40-44, 48, 90.  
2 For the most prominent account, see S Guardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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unparalleled and increasing.3 The UK contains neither of these, and parliamentary sovereignty, 
for better or worse, has been upheld as the UK’s primary constitutional principle. It is this 
steadfast attachment to parliamentary sovereignty that has led to Lady Hale’s—and no doubt, 
many UK constitutional philosophers’—dissonance.  
An inherent element of dissonance lies within the UK judiciary’s DNA. Most judges, and 
especially those sitting on the higher-level courts, were educated under the doctrine that 
Parliament, not the courts, had the final say in legal matters. Indeed there is widespread 
consensus that the UK judiciary has played a significant role throughout the years in upholding 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 4  The most recent example came in Miller.5  A 
significant amount of judges—and every member of the UKSC—gained their legal education 
when there was no HRA 1998, no Supreme Court, little devolution, and no statutory mention 
of the rule of law. 6  Over the years, however, judges have had to account for the new 
institutional and constitutional arrangements. These internal constitutional changes need to be 
coupled with the external constitutional landscape, where written constitutions and extremely 
powerful constitutional courts are now ubiquitous.7  But the dissonance shown by Lady Hale 
is different: as noted above, it does not focus merely on the interaction of the separation of 
powers: although it centres on the underlying principles of UK constitution, it is a more 
nuanced and personal form of constitutional struggle. 
 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND DISSONANT CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Although law is plagued with areas of conflict, dissonance is not exactly the same thing. The 
main difference is that conflict occurs pre-decision, while dissonance occurs post-decision. 
Thus the uncomfortable tension that one feels after a decision is made is dissonance, and stems 
from the pre-decision feelings of being conflicted by different cognitions. The concept of 
cognitive dissonance arose to prominence in the 1950s, after publication of Festinger, Riecken 
and Schachter’s When Prophecy Fails,8 followed a year later by Festinger’s classic, A Theory 
of Cognitive Dissonance.9 In the latter Festinger noted that humans try “to establish internal 
                                                          
3 R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard 
University Press 2004). 
4 See, e.g., TT Arvind and L Straton, “Legal ideology, legal doctrine and the UK's top judges” (2016) Public 
Law 418, 424-25.  
5 Miller n 1. 
6 Regarding the latter, see the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2005.  
7 Hirschl n 3.  
8 L Festinger, H Riecken, and S Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (Harper-Torchbooks 1956).  
9 L Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press 1957).   
harmony, consistency, or congruity among [their] opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values”.10 
If a decision is made which arouses dissonance, we attempt to reduce it through certain 
methods. Often these reduction behaviours occur through attitudinal changes, as opposed to 
behavioural changes, but they can occur through both. In short, individuals often justify their 
decisions through a change in their attitudes. For example, someone who is choosing between 
a practical fuel-efficient car and a sports car may justify their decision to purchase the sports 
car by changing their attitudes to certain features: e.g., they made a major financial investment, 
and fuel efficiency is not really that important to them. 11  Reduction of these dissonant 
cognitions is a key aspect of dissonance theory. Without a doubt, the implications of cognitive 
dissonance theory for jurisprudence is enticing, given the many difficult decisions judges face 
on a daily basis.  
Here I propose that Lady Hale uses her extra-judicial speeches to reduce her cognitive 
dissonance about the UK constitution and her role as a Supreme Court Justice in upholding 
parliamentary sovereignty. There is little doubt that the justices, and especially one as tuned-in 
as Lady Hale, have recognised the well-documented changes in the domestic and international 
constitutional landscape. This includes a diminished role for parliamentary sovereignty 
throughout the world. But domestically, even with membership in the EU, parliamentary 
sovereignty has been taken extremely seriously: for example, the Human Rights Act 1998 
upholds parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, for all its changes throughout the years, the 
fundamentals of the UK constitution remain unchanged: Parliament is still the UK’s highest 
legal authority, and the judiciary often recognises this, as they have done in Miller and other 
cases. But recognition of parliamentary sovereignty does not necessary align with advocating 
it. If justices wanted to advocate it, they could do so in the very extra-judicial speeches that I 
examine below.  
There is a feeling from many constitutional actors in the UK that parliamentary sovereignty 
has had its time. Either it is on its way out,12 never was as defining as it is believed to be,13 or 
it is only one principle amongst other underlying principles, 14  and not the underlying 
constitutional principle. And therein lies the attitude adjustment necessary for Lady Hale: 
                                                          
10 Ibid at [260].  
11 J Cooper, Cognitive Dissonance: Fifty Years of a Classic Theory (Sage 2007). 
12 M Elliott, “United Kingdom: Parliamentary sovereignty under pressure” (2004) 2(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 545.  
13 F Davis, “Brexit, the Statute of Westminster and Zombie Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2016) 27(3) King’s 
Law Journal 344. Of course, in Scotland the principle of parliamentary sovereignty has always been questioned 
more forcefully than in England. See, e.g., JDB Mitchell, Constitutional Law (W. Green & Son Ltd. 1964) 49-
73.  
14 CJS Knight, “Bi-polar sovereignty restated” (2009) 68(2) Cambridge Law Journal 361.  
although she has contributed to upholding parliamentary sovereignty throughout her judicial 
career—and this aligns with the constitutional mores of the time—her extra-judicial statements 
advance the idea that parliamentary sovereignty should no longer be the defining feature of the 
UK constitution. Thus she is able to reduce her post-decision dissonance by giving extra-
judicial speeches that question the value of parliamentary sovereignty or show it as a 
diminished value within a flexible UK constitution. Those teaching UK constitutional law may 
do something similar: we describe parliamentary sovereignty to students as the underlying 
principle of the constitution, but some may then write journal articles arguing a contrary 
position or advocate change to a fellow scholar, thus potentially reducing their cognitive 
dissonance.15 Lawyers working on public law cases, or those working in parliament may 
experience similar feelings. This phenomenon, and how is transpires in the UK, is best 
described as: dissonant constitutionalism.   
 
LADY HALE’S RECENT EXTRA-JUDICIAL SPEECHES 
One speech from each of the past three years (2015-2017) is analysed below. All three involve 
general discussion of the UK constitution, and a number of themes involving where 
parliamentary sovereignty stands in the UK constitution arise, including: the lack of a UK 
written constitution, the potential striking down of legislation, whether the UKSC is a proper 
public law/constitutional court, and questioning the true “guardians” of the UK constitution. 
All of these seem to challenge the status quo, and are perhaps signs of dissonance reduction.  
 
2015 St. Andrews speech 
In her 2015 inaugural address at the Institute of Legal and Constitutional Research at the 
University of St. Andrews, Lady Hale made a number of stimulating observations.16 Although 
she began her speech by noting that the UKSC is “not a constitutional court on continental 
lines”, she took particular concern in observing how continental and other constitutional courts 
around the world operate.17 She accentuated how most Anglo-American jurisdictions follow 
the common law model of a written constitution, which includes judicial review on the validity 
of statutory law. Using Marbury v Madison18 as an example of how this develops even when a 
                                                          
15 Although, whether or not teaching the traditional view of the UK constitution is a “decision” is certainly up 
for debate.  
16 Lady Hale, “The UK Supreme Court in the United Kingdom Constitution” (8 Oct 2015) 1-2. { HYPERLINK 
"https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-151008.pdf" } (emphasis is mine). 
17 Ibid at [1-2]. 
18 Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803).  
written constitution does not explicitly mention constitutional review, she further notes that the 
UK does not have such a document, and therefore a similar trajectory for the UKSC would be 
unlikely.19 But that is hardly her final view.  
Lady Hale goes on to cite Dicey’s key constitutional principles, but notes that they have 
undergone some “subtle changes” since first articulated.20 Some major questions are then set 
out regarding parliamentary sovereignty and rule of law. The first is where the sovereignty of 
Parliament stands today, after ceding legislative competence both downwards (i.e., through 
devolution) and upwards (i.e., to the EU).21 Lady Hale questions how these developments have 
affected the UKSC’s power to rule on the validity of Acts of Parliament. 22  After these 
intriguing sovereignty questions, she then boldly asks,  
“Where stands the rule of law today? The rule of law has historically been the servant 
of Parliamentary sovereignty…In those rare cases where the two organising principles 
of our Constitution might conflict, which will take priority? Might the rule of law, in 
fact, become the organising principle of our Constitution?”23 
It is difficult to consider the above statement as a mere thought experiment, as opposed to a 
suggestive piece of foreshadowing. Her questions seem more like prominent declarations 
regarding what should—or indeed may—happen to the UK constitution. Of course, a taste of 
this was provided in her 2005 Jackson dissent,24 but such prominent rhetoric displays that Lady 
Hale now has another outlet for dissonance reduction: extra-judicial speeches.   
Justice Hale also discusses the “very new” powers of abstract review the UKSC gained on 
devolved parliaments, which occurs after pieces of legislation have passed all Parliamentary 
stages, but before they receive the Royal Assent.25 Although the court has not had any referrals 
from Scotland as yet, they have had three such referrals from Wales. The first two were deemed 
to be within Wales’ devolved powers, but the third piece of legislation, the Recovery of 
Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill, was found by the Court to be outside of the 
Assembly’s devolved powers.26 Lady Hale even provocatively notes that the “majority were 
noticeably less respectful of the decisions of a democratically elected legislature” than they had 
                                                          
19 Lady Hale, “The UK Supreme Court” at [2]. 
20 Ibid at [3]. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
24 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, paras. 142-166. 
25 Lady Hale, “The UK Supreme Court” at [9].  
26 Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill, [2015] UKSC 3.  
been in the past.27 Even if this statement is accurate, it is certainly not encouraging to hear that 
judges were less respectful of such decisions. In fact, Lady Hale’s statement comes across more 
as a warning than anything.  
The end of the speech provides more dissension. First adopting a softer tone, Justice Hale 
accentuates the current situation as regards parliamentary sovereignty: “We will, of course, 
continue to do whatever Parliament tells us to do”.28 Yet her close adopts an about-face, as she 
maintains: “It has always been the role of a constitutional court to protect fundamental rights, 
within the framework of the law and the Constitution, and that is what an independent judiciary 
will continue to do to the best of its ability”.29 Thus, she has gone from the UKSC merely 
resembling other constitutional courts, to recognising the UKSC as a full-blown constitutional 
court. She continues by stating that, “The rule of law is something more than the mere servant 
of Parliament. The quid pro quo is that we must stay true to our judicial oath, ‘to do right by 
all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection 
or ill-will’”.30 Although the reader is left to ponder what that the “something more” is, the 
statements certainly challenge the constitutional status quo in the United Kingdom.  
 
2016 speech in Malaysia 
Another example stems from one of Lady Hale’s late 2016 speeches: the Sultan Azlan Shah 
Lecture in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 31  This speech was widely read, as Lady Hale 
controversially alluded to the impending Brexit case, Miller, even if the resulting fervour was 
misplaced.32 Challenges to the constitutional status quo, and therefore levers for dissonance 
reduction, abound in her speech. For instance, Lady Hale titled the speech: “The Supreme 
Court: Guardian of the Constitution?” Employing this type of “guardian” rhetoric explicitly 
cloaks the speech in forceful, provocative language. The talk begins similar to the 2015 St. 
Andrews speech, discussing written constitutions and how far the UK is out-of-step with the 
international constitutional landscape. Marbury v Madison and the striking down of 
                                                          
27 Lady Hale, “The UK Supreme Court”, at [10]. This exact line is also used in the 2016 Malaysia speech below, 
at [6].  
28 Ibid at [16]. 
29 Ibid at [17] (emphasis is mine). 
30 Ibid at [17]. 
31 Lady Hale, “The Supreme Court: Guardian of the Constitution?”, Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (9 November 
2016), { HYPERLINK "https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-161109.pdf" }.  
32 BC Jones, “Where do Justice Ginsburg and Justice Hale—and Judicial Independence—Go from Here?” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog (30 November 2016), { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/11/where-do-justice-ginsburg-and-justice-hale-and-
judicial-independence-go-from-here/" }.  
parliamentary acts is again discussed, and the theme of “constitutional guardians” aligns well 
with the discussion in her 2015 speech of “proper” or “official” constitutional courts.33  
Lady Hale then articulates a number of ways in which members of the UKSC have become 
“the guardians of the United Kingdom constitution”.34 Firstly, as mentioned in the 2015 speech, 
she discusses the abstract powers of review regarding the validity of devolved legislation, 
touching on some matters noted in the 2015 speech. Then she moves onto administrative 
judicial review, noting the deep historical relevance of this process, but adding, “In this we see 
ourselves as the servants of the sovereign legislature”.35 Interesting statement, considering she 
began this section by noting the UKSC was “the guardian of the UK constitution”.  
Lady Hale continues by discussing one of her favourite extra-judicial topics: constitutional 
review of legislation. She ultimately concedes the following,  
“We cannot strike down Acts of the UK Parliament. But please do not think that I – or 
any of my brethren – want us to be able to do that. We are, I think, very comfortable 
with the role that we do have. This includes the various rules of statutory interpretation 
which govern the way in which we read legislation and enable us to safeguard 
fundamental rights and the rule of law”.36 
Although capitulating in tone, adding the qualifier “I think” to whether the Justices are 
comfortable with their current role instils little, if any, confidence in the statement. And neither 
does the analysis below it. Again discussing Jackson,37 Lady Hale chooses to bracket a quote 
by former UKSC Deputy President Lord Hope, which can only be characterised as a distortion 
of the UK constitution: “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor 
upon which our constitution is based”.38  She merely adds that the person who wrote the 
majority opinion, Lord Bingham, “did not agree”.39  
It then comes as no surprise that when concluding her speech, Lady Hale notes in relation 
to the Miller case that the Government had abandoned claims of justiciability, and that at least 
in that sense, “it is accepted that we are indeed the guardians of the Constitution: if only we 
knew what it meant”.40 Perhaps this last clause remains the clearest sign of Lady Hale’s 
constitutional conflict. Nevertheless, it is indeed peculiar that “the” has been added to the 
                                                          
33 Lady Hale, “Guardian of the Constitution” at [3].  
34 Ibid (emphasis is mine).  
35 Ibid at [6]. 
36 Ibid at [9-10].  
37 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56.  
38 Lady Hale, “Guardian of the Constitution” at [11].  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid at [13]. 
phrase “guardians of the Constitution”; after all, Lady Hale failed to insert it into the title of 
her address.  
 
2017 speech in Canada 
The final speech analysed comes in mid-2017, almost half a year after the Miller case, at the 
Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies.41 Starting off on well-trodden ground, Justice 
Hale points out the UK’s lack of a codified constitution. She then goes on to analyse three 
separate constitutional issues in a UK context: protection of fundamental rights; distribution of 
sovereign powers between States and the Federation; and distribution of sovereign power. This 
analysis focuses on the third. However there is one lingering issue from earlier speeches that 
is resolved. After wavering in previous speeches as to whether or not the UKSC was a 
constitutional court, Lady Hale decides this definitively in this speech, noting that whether or 
not they have been officially anointed as such, “the Court has to behave like a proper 
constitutional court”.42  
Lady Hale begins her discussion of the third topic, distribution of sovereign power, by 
noting it is the “biggest” and “most fundamental” issue of the three, yet qualifies this by 
cheekily stating “we always thought that we knew what it meant”.43 What follows is a detailed 
examination of ways parliamentary sovereignty has been challenged over the years. She cites 
a recent article by Fergal Davis, who notes that parliamentary sovereignty was conceded long 
before the EC Act 1972, and argues that Brexit requires a fresh constitutional settlement.44 
After further discussion of some parliamentary sovereignty restraints (e.g., rules of statutory 
construction, voluntary conceding of power), Lady Hale then identifies a “change” that could 
“prove more radical and fundamental” than anything noted above, and that threatens the very 
idea of representative democracy: no, not the rise of authoritarianism or the sickening hate 
speech we see on social media, but…citizens voting in referendums.45 Although Justice Hale 
is right to say that the holding of referendums could become more commonplace within the 
UK (especially given that it is legislated for in the European Union Act 2011), a conclusion 
that “the ‘people’…is a contestable concept” does not exactly make the case that parliamentary 
                                                          
41 Lady Hale, “The United Kingdom Constitution on the Move” The Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal 
Studies’ Cambridge Lectures (7 July 2017), { HYPERLINK 
"https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170707.pdf" }.  
42 Ibid at [6]. 
43 Ibid at [8].  
44 F Davis, “Brexit, the Statute of Westminster 1931 and Zombie Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2016) 27(3) 
King’s Law Journal 344. 
45 Lady Hale, “Constitution on the Move” [13-14]. 
sovereignty has been seriously challenged; nor does her other conclusion, that parliamentary 
sovereignty had been damaged by MPs respecting the referendum vote.46  
The speech concludes with discussion around the rule of law and Miller, with Lady Hale 
assuring the audience that the rule of law is “alive and well”.47 And given the changing nature 
of the UK constitution, Justice Hale declares that a written document will not come into being 
“any time soon”.48 From the perspective of UK Supreme Court justices, this is not necessarily 
a bad thing. As Lady Hale notes,  
“This means, of course, that the Supreme Court is not going to get the power to behave 
like other Supreme Courts in the common law world, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and strike down Acts of the UK Parliament as unconstitutional and that, as 
far as I am concerned, is a very good thing”!49 
 
Digesting Lady Hale’s speeches  
One of the intriguing aspects of Lady Hale’s speeches is that if you were to cherry pick 
particular bits of them—similar to what I have done above—the UK constitution could be seen 
in two very different lights. This is especially relevant in the 2015 speech at St. Andrews, which 
distinctly wavers between loyalty to Parliament and the current constitutional arrangements, 
and forceful questioning of the current underlying constitutional principles. The latter includes 
suggestions that the current arrangements are obtuse or irrelevant in an increasingly modern 
constitutional landscape. Some may contend that that the speeches represent a traditional 
separation of powers constitutional struggle of the judiciary looking to assert itself. But that 
version is too simplified. Justice Hale’s conflict—and her subsequent dissonance—
surrounding the UK constitution are deeper than most, and by articulating this (at times) 
alternative constitutional vision, the reduction of her cognitive dissonance is playing out in her 
speeches. Thus, the speeches embody a genuine struggle—a type of dissonant 
constitutionalism that we rarely see displayed in democracies.  
Another striking aspect of the speeches is the explicit focus on constitutional arrangements. 
In two separate speeches Lady Hale notes that she is happy that the UKSC cannot strike down 
Acts of Parliament.50  This is the power that most constitutional courts around the world 
possess, but which the UKSC does not. Of course, not having to determine whether 
                                                          
46 Ibid at [14-15]. 
47 Ibid at [15]. 
48 Ibid at [17].  
49 Ibid. 
50 Lady Hale, “Guardian of the Constitution” and “Constitution on the Move”.   
parliamentary-backed statutory law should override a written constitution is indeed a 
comfortable place to be in compared to other courts, who must frequently decide these issues. 
But advocating for the UKSC to be a “proper” constitutional court; denigrating the UK for not 
having a written constitution; and championing the rule of law to either parallel or replace 
parliamentary sovereignty as the underlying principle of the UK constitution are things that 
will bring this about. Lady Hale certainly knows this. Her insistence on challenging the 
fundamental principles of the UK constitution—which have been in place since the Glorious 
Revolution—is more radical than having the powers to strike down statutory law.  
 
THE PUBLIC ROLE OF UKSC JUDGES 
Senior UK judges have always been major public figures, and extra-judicial speeches will often 
attract the interest of the press.51 During these activities, they are asked to remain politically 
neutral and not to engage in controversy. Indeed, extra-judicial speeches and writings have 
long been a part of the common law tradition, and this is especially true in the UK. The 2009 
UKSC Guide to Judicial Conduct formalises this, stating that:  
“[T]he Justices recognise that it is important for members of the Court to deliver 
lectures and speeches, to take part in conferences and seminars, to write and to teach 
and generally to contribute to debate on matters of public interest in the law, the 
administration of justice, and the judiciary. Their aim is to enhance professional and 
public understanding of the issues and of the role of the Court”.52 
Ewing asserts that the rules in the UK as regards judicial speech have been relaxed in recent 
years, and standards in the 2009 UKSC Guide remain more “permissive than restrictive”.53 
Although judges share the right to freedom of expression like any citizen, they are also 
constrained by their judicial role, in the sense that they must “uphold the dignity of their office”. 
And yet, Ewing has rightly pointed out that there is not a hard and fast rule against bias or 
impartiality as regards extra-judicial speech, but a more obscure rule of misjudgement when 
                                                          
51 E.g., M Scott, “After discussing Brexit's potential legal hitches, Lady Hale may be wise to quit Article 50 
case” The Telegraph (17 November 2016), { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/17/after-discussing-brexits-potential-legal-
hitches-lady-hale-may-b/" }.  
52 United Kingdom Supreme Court, “Guide to Judicial Conduct” (2009), 3.4, { HYPERLINK 
"https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/guide-to-judicial_conduct.pdf" }.  
53 K Ewing, “Judges and free speech in the United Kingdom”, in HP Lee, Judiciaries in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge 2011) 242-43. 
expressing their views; after all, judges have been permitted to attack governments, criticise 
foreign governments, and robustly—and publicly—disagree with one another.54  
In the speeches examined above, the claims made by the new UKSC President probably do 
not violate any standards of impartiality set out in statutory form or by any Code. Partisan 
politics is not a direct element of the speeches, and the statements also do not engender any 
perceived bias or pre-judgment of cases. Some material, however, deals with perhaps more 
significant issues: what constitutional principles the UK is founded on, and which ones should 
stay in operation. In some ways these examples are similar to the Sheriff Peter Thompson case 
in the 1970s, which remains the only modern case of judicial removal based on extra-judicial 
speech. Thompson was not directly advocating or engaging in party politics (although his views 
did align with one party), but addressing the underlying principles of how the governmental 
system of Scotland was run.55 He believed that having a national legislature and increased 
Scottish Home Rule would be beneficial. Ultimately, however, he was stripped of his judicial 
duties for advocating such views. No one would possibly consider this fate for Lady Hale, but 
what she is advocating in some of her speeches above is not entirely different. Thankfully, 
times have changed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although controversial extra-judicial speeches certainly remain cause for concern, this article 
provides an alternative view of this controversy: perhaps such provocations should be more 
accepted. As long as these speeches remain a place for judges to reduce their cognitive 
dissonance over various matters that arise through their jurisprudence—and therefore, such 
provocations are not seen in their more formal responsibilities, such as judgements—they may 
be a healthier and less controversial way of dealing with constitutional conflict. 
Ultimately, Lady Hale’s struggles remain all of our struggles.   
                                                          
54 Ibid at [250-51].  
55 Ibid at [237-39]. 
